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Abstract. Social psychology is presently dominated by cognitive
theories that emphasize the importance of personal beliefs and in-
tellective processes as the immediate determinants of behavior.
The present paper explores two areas of.research within this tra-
dition : (1) beliefs about the external world, and (2) beliefs
about the self. The paper concludes with a brief critique of
the cognitive approach to social psychology.
Social psychology, along with many other areas of behavioral research,
is presently dominated by the cognitive point of view. In preparing to
write this paper it was therefore difficult to determine what aspects of
social psychology could legitimately be regarded as &dquo;noncognitive,&dquo; and
hence irrelevant to the topic under consideration. I have therefore taken
the liberty of covering the field somewhat selectively, so that I might
have the opportunity to discuss some continuing themes that strike me as
particularly interesting and noteworthy.
For the social psychologist, the cognitive approach normally implies
an emphasis on personal beliefs and hypotheses as the immediate determin-
ants of behavior. Cognitive social psychologists thus focus on what Lewin
called the perceived world, including the inferences and illusions that
derive from cognitive activity, as opposed to the unembellished objective
reality of the physical and social environment. The dominant tone empha-
sizes man’s rational, intellective processes and downgrades the importance
of irrational and self-serving motives, mindless conformity, and mechan-
istic learning principles. Thus, a number of investigators have recently
focussed attention on the number and the quality of the arguments that
support a given position, as important determinants of attitude change
(Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977; Eagly, 1974; Greenwald, 1968). On the other
hand, man’s cognitive capacities are finite, and these limits should perhaps
be more explicitly recognized by social psychologists (Dawes, 1975). For
example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have shown that people have a limited
capacity to report on their own cognitive processes, and as we shall see be-
low, people’s intuitive judgments are often unaffected by information that
should (logically) be influential.
’ 
Before getting into the main body of our discussion, we should note
that the social psychologist’s expression of the cognitive viewpoint is
frequently rather different from the cognitive models that have been pro-
posed in experimental psychology. For one thing, the cognitive social
psychologist has often been concerned with the substantive inferences and
generalizations we derive from our past and present experiences, generali-
zations that can be expressed in simple verbal terms (e.g., if Bob and .
Bill like the same things, they will probably like each other). In con-
trast, the experimental psychologist has been more concerned with charac-
terizing the cognitive system (or process), by abstractly describing
the different stages and types of information-processing that he deems
important. For the experimentalist, moreover, the cognitive approach
normally implies a computer-inspired conception of mental functioning,
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while the social psychologist has usually been more traditional, prefer-
ring to borrow his models from &dquo;bubbe-psychology,&dquo; or from the implicit
psychology of the man-in-the-street (for those like Kelly, G.A. and Kelley,




A final characteristic of the cognitive approach to social psychology
is the assumption that our beliefs and attitudes are organized (at least
loosely) into a structured system of some sort. This is normally taken
to imply that certain &dquo;configurations&dquo; will commonly be encountered, while
others will not (i.e., our beliefs should be sensibly related to one
another). The configural assumption leads to the prediction that cogni-
tive changes in one part of the system should normally lead to &dquo;filter
down&dquo; effects in other parts (1lcGuire, 1968). For example, upon learning
(to my surprise) that Bill is angry at Bob, I may change my feelings about
one or both of them.
&dquo; The material that follows is divided into two main sections. In
the first section we will review a number of investigations that explore
people’s belief systems with primary emphasis on the external world. The
second section concerns the perceived self as an object of cognitive
appraisal and as a determinant of action. These two foci, the external
world and the self, appear to be natural (inevitable?) topics of interest
for cognitive theories that emphasize the phenomenology of the man-in-the-
street. For if cognitive activity is to be useful in the guidance of ac-
tion, we must appraise both the external world (physical and social) and
our selves (capacities; preferences, etc.), so that we can choose courses
of action that are realistic and suitable to our needs.
Beliefs about the World: Logic and Social Cognition
The past two decades of social psychological research have included
several attempts to demonstrate that man is (or is not) a natural logician
in thinking about the social world. This literature has, however, changed
somewhat over the years. The earlier studies tended to use verbal logic
as a normative baseline, while more recent investigations have been con-
cerned with people’s intuitive adherence to statistical models, with par-
ticular emphasis on Bayes’ theorem and the analysis of variance. There
has also been an increasing tendency to account for logical shortcomings
by pointing to the fact that man’s cognitive capacities are limited and
often biased; hence errors in judgment need not derive from &dquo;deep&dquo; emo-
tional sources (Dawes, 1975).
The Socratic Effect
McGuire’s work on cognitive structure (1960, 1968) provides us with
an early illustration of research comparing human perfor~3nce to a norma-
tive model of social cognition. These studies were based on the notion
that human thought is organized, at least in part, in a syllogistic fash-
ion, in which logically-linked premises are loosely related to their prop-
er conclusions. For example, a person who believes (a) there is a good
chance that any city which could be easily reached by air from the Euro-
pean continent would be destroyed in an atomic attack if there was another
world war; and who also believes (b) that his own city could easily be
reached by airplanes based in Europe, should logically accept the idea
(c) that his own city was very likely to be destroyed through bombing
in the event of a world war. McGuire found that responses to an item
like (c), the conclusion of the syllogism, were predictable from the re-
spondent’s beliefs regarding (a) and (b), the premises. He also reported
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evidence of a Socratic effect, in which the simple arousal of these re-
lated beliefs (when the questionnaire was initially administered) led to
a spontaneous gain in logical consistency when the respondents were rc-
tested a week later. In addition to these data, which suggested the ex-
istence of a loosely linked logical system, McGuire’s results also in-
cluded substantial evidence of wish fulfillment, for his respondents
tended to believe most fervently in conclusions that depicted desirable
rather than undesirable situations, even though this tendency impaired
the internal consistency of their beliefs.
This line of work was further developed by Wyer (1974; Rosen and Wyer,
1972), who used the test-retest (Socratic) methodology to assess several
well-known models of cognitive functioning. Wyer’s results were consist-
ent with the idea that beliefs and attitudes were organized into an im-
plicit system, and he concluded that for the average respondent, this sys-
tem was in general conformity with the laws of mathematical probability.
In particular, he repeatedly found that his respondents’ beliefs concern-
ins related issues conformed to the equation:
In this formulation, P and Pub are the probabilities that events A and
B will occur; PR’ is the probability of B given the occurrence of A.
pAI (=l-P A) is the probability that A will not occur, and P B4A’ is theconditional probability of B, given that A does not occur. Wyer’s re-
sults here may be regarded as supportive of McGuire’s work, since the
probability-formulation is very similar (logically) to the syllogistic
model that motivated McGuire’s research. Wyer’s conclusions are also
consistent with the views of Peterson and Beach (1967) who suggested
that &dquo;...the normative [statisticall =odcl provides a good first approx-
imation for a psychological theory of inference. Inferences made by
subjects are influenced by appropriate variables and in appropriate
. directions. But there are systematic discrepancies between normative
and intuitive inferences...[for the subject’s] sensitivity is often less
than optimal.&dquo; tI
Intuitive Judgments May be Statistically Naive
A number of writers have challenged the view that intuitive think-
ing is congruent with the postulates of probability theory (Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971; Fischoff, 1975). For one thing, people seem unaware
of the fact that a large sample of observations will normally yield
more stable results than a small one’(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1974).
A phenomenon that has attracted even more scientific attention is the
fact that people are relatively insensitive to &dquo;base-rate&dquo; information
when making predictions or other judgments about particular events; in-
stead, they focus almost exclusively on information derived from the
target case with which they are faced. This approach is, however, in-
consistent with Bayes’ theorem, which tells us that in judging the like-
lihood of a particular event (e.g., the likelihood that Her. Smith is a
chemist), we should attend not only to his individual characteristics,
but should also take account of the base rate for that event (the per-
centage of chemists in the population as a whole). To demonstrate their
point, Kahneman and Tversky asked a large number of respondents to indi-
cate the probability that a particular individual, who was described in
a brief unrevealing characterization, was an engineer versus a lawyer.
Some people were told that the individual in question was a member of a
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country club that included 70% lawyers and 30X engineers; others were
told that only 30% of the club members were lawyers, while the remaining
70X were engineers. Application of Bayes’ theorem suggests that these
contrasting base rates should have exerted a substantial influence on
the respondents’ judgments. The base rate information was largely ig-
nored, however.
More recent work in this area challenges the generality of Kahneman
and Tversky’s initial findings, and suggests that’base rate information
may be effectively utilized if it seems causally related to the target
case in question (Ajzen, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, in press). For examp-
le, if we learn that 70% (versus 30%) of the students in a class have
failed a particular exam, this base rate data is likely to affect our
judgment when we are asked to estimate Johnny Jones’ chances of passing.
In a case like this, the reported failure rate provides us with informa-
tion regarding a causal factor in the situation (the difficulty of the
exam) that might affect anyone’s chances of success; and people seem
quite responsive to causal data when making predictions, perhaps because
of our overwhelming familiarity with cause-and-effect sequences or
&dquo;scripts&dquo; (Abelson, 1977). It seems reasonable to expect, moreover, that
base-rate information that engaged other familiar scripts or schemas
might also be readily applied, although this has yet to be demonstrated.,
This seems like a potentially fruitful area for further research.
The salience of base-rate data. Base-rate information may often be
disregarded because it seems dull and remote. Thus, in many situations
we may be faced with the task of making some type of prediction about a
particular person whose interesting individual traits and abilities ex-
ert a disproportionate claim on our limited attention span, crowding out
considerations of base-rates and the like. This type of attentional
problem may sometimes be exacerbated by experimental settings which sug-
gest that the respondent’s ability to produce an accurate prediction is
reflective of his social sensitivity and his responsiveness to subtle
individuating cues. Under these circumstances the respondent might feel
he was evading the spirit of the experiment (&dquo;cheating&dquo;) if he based his
predictions on merely statistical (base-rate) considerations, as opposed
to the richer, more individuating information associated with the target
case.
This analysis suggests that while there may be many situations in
which base-rate is underutilized (if it is used at all), our incapacity
in this regard may depend on the salience of the available information.
Perceptual salience has also been emphasized as an important variable
in studies of the attribution process’(see below). To test the idea
that base-rate information might be effectively utilized if it was pre-
sented in interesting, concrete terms, Manis and Dovalina (1977) used a
case-bY7case presentation method. Respondents were shown a large number
of yearbook photographs, one at a time, and were told that certain people
had plans for graduate school, while others did not. In this way, one
group was led to believe that 70X of the graduating class had further
educational plans; another group was led to believe that only 30% had
post-graduate educational plans. Following this induction series all
respondents were presented with several of the pictures that had previ-
ously been shown, plus some &dquo;new&dquo; pictures. The respondents had two
tasks: (a) first, they were to indicate whether each picture was &dquo;new&dquo;
or &dquo;old;&dquo; (b) next, they were to indicate their best estimate as to
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each person’s plans concerning graduate school, and were instructed to
guess if they had not previously been given explicit information about
a particular individual. In this situation the base-rates were readily
utilized. For example, when the induction series suggested that many
(707) of the seniors were planning to go on to graduate school, the re-
’ 
spondents assumed that in cases where they had not been given direct
information about someone’s future plans,.these individuals were also
likely to go on for further schooling about 70% of the time.
Attribution Theory
Attribution theory, as expressed in Kelley’s cube model (19G7),
.represents another expression of the idea that spontaneous thought often
follows a systematic course that is roughly congruent with a well-known
formal model---the ANOVA model. Kelley contends that in searching for
the cause(s) of some observed action, the naive observer operates much
like the idealized scientist; that is, he coolly attempts to identify
the antecedents that covary with the effect (the act in question) that
he wishes to explain. Kelley’s model thus assumes that normal processes
of social inference are quite rational, and are in fact closely modelled
on the scheme that J. S. Mills outlined in his method of differences.
This formulation was empirically tested in MacArthur’s well known dis-
sertation (1973) with promising results.
Most recently, however, Kelley’s theory, with its central assump-
tion of human rationality and sensitivity to the covariation of causes
and effects, has been challenged by several investigators who contend
that in searching for the causes of behavior, the average respondent is
sometimes less than logical. In particular, these critics have argued,
we are often quite resistant to the idea that a given action can be ef-
fectively explained by considering the actor’s circumstances; instead,
we normally prefer to account for human actions by focusing on internal
(personal) determinants, such as the actor’s traits, preferences, and
motives. Several lines of research support this general conclusion.
Discounting social pressures. Several studies have shown that even
when clearcut information is provided regarding the importance of situ-
ational factors in a given behavioral episode, observers may nonethe-
less continue to believe that the act in question was at least partly
reflective of some personal characteristic of the actor (e.g., his at-
titude or ability). For example, Jones and Harris (1967) had a group
of respondents rate an essay that favored (or opposed) Castro’s Cuba;
their task was to estimate the writer’s private views on this topic.
The results indicated that a person who had presented a particular view-
point was generally assumed to favor that stand, even by respondents who
had been explicitly informed that the writer was simply following in-
structions, e.g., to produce a pro-Castro essay, and was not necessarily
expressing his personal beliefs. Some investigators believe that these
results derive from the fact that behavior normally &dquo;engulfs the field&dquo;
because of its capacity tq command our attention. A recent study by
Yandell and Insko (1977) suggests, however, that this effect is not com-
pletely due to the perceptual salience of behavior, but may instead de-
rive from the implicit belief that our own views are widely shared by
others. According to this account, upon reading a persuasive essay
that expresses a particular viewpoint (as requested by the experimenter),
the listener may be partly persuaded by the arguments that are adduced,
and may consequently assume that like &dquo;most others,&dquo; the writer’s views
are probably reasonably similar to his own. Ross, Greene, and House
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(1977) have provided further information testifying to the widespread be-
lief that others usually act and feel the same way we do (the &dquo;false con-
sensus effect&dquo;).
The vicissitudes of &dquo;consensus information. Kelley’s attribution
model implies that an action which is taken by &dquo;most people&dquo; will not
normally be regarded as an expression of internal traits or predisposi-
tions, but will instead, seem to derive from external (situational) de-
terminants. On the other hand, several experimenters have reported that
naive explanations for a given act are often insensitive to variations
in consensus (the number of individuals who act or feel the same way as
the target case, whose behavior is to-be-explained). A recent study by
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) provides a good example. In one part of this
experiment the subjects read about a study by Darley and Latane (1968)
that was concerned with people’s readiness to help someone who appeared
to be having an epileptic seizure. One group of respondents was provid-
ed with information about the experimental procedures plus the surprising
results of the original study, which showed that the most common response
to the confederate’s &dquo;distress&dquo; was to do nothing at all! Other respond-
ents learned about the experimental procedures, but were not given infor-
mation as to the original results. Both groups of respondents were sub-
sequently asked to explain the behavior of a particular target case, Greg
R., a freshman who had not helped in the &dquo;emergency&dquo; situation. Respond-
ents who had been told the results of the Darley-Latane experiment
should have avoided explanations that focused on Greg’s individual quali-
ties or dispositions (since he had acted as many others did), and should
instead have emphasized situational factors. The results did not, how-
ever, support this line of reasoning. Moreover, when asked to predict
the behavior of specific others who were said to have participated in
the original experiment there was no evidence that the respondents had
been influenced by the behavioral base-rates they had received, i.e.,
by the frequency of different responses to the &dquo;emergency.&dquo;
How can we explain these surprising results? Nisbett and Borgida
suggest that their data are related to Kahneman and Tversky’s observation
that we are often insensitive to base-rate information, and they contend
that these results may be primarily due to attentional factors, since
both base-rates and consensus data are commonly presented in pallid, ab-
stract terms. An alternative explanation for these results focuses on
the possibility that the respondents’ beliefs concerning what &dquo;most oth-
ers&dquo; will do (or would have done) in any given situation may not be ef-
fectively controlled by simply telling them what a particular sample of
respondents has done in the past. The behavior that is reported for a
sample may, for example, depart substantially from what the respondent
would normally have anticipated. In such a case, many people may assume
that the sample was probably unusual in some way; hence they might reason
that the behavior of the sample should not be taken as an indication of
what people in a representative sample would do. Nor need the near-una-
nimity of behavior shown by an &dquo;unusual&dquo; sample imply that powerful sit-
uational forces have been operative.
To assess this line of analysis, Wells and Harvey (1977) repeated
the essentials of the Nisbett-Borgida experiment, but took considerable
pains to inform their respondents that the sample whose behavior they
had learned about was selected through a random process, and was conse-
quently representative and typical of the population from which they were
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drawn. When special attention was in this way directed to the typicality
of the respondents in the study being described, there was some evidence
that the subjects were more sensitive to variations in the behavioral re-
ports they had received. For example, subjects who had been given assur-
ances concerning the typicality of the sample were more likely to follow
Kelley’s (1967) model. by interpreting the behavior of an individual who
conformed to the sample norm as reflectinp, the influence of situational
forces.
Despite this demonstration that base-rate data can sometimes be in-
fluential, it is important to note that even in the Wells and Harvey ex-
periment there was clear evidence that the base-rate information was _un-
derutilized. For one thing, when asked to estimates how quickly they
themselves would have helped the &dquo;epileptic,&dquo; had they been included in
the original study, the subjects’ responses were unaffected by the base-
rate (consensus) information that had been provided, suggesting once
again that people underestimate the power of situational influences.
Moreover, as Borgida and Nisbett suggest (1977), there are two standards
(criteria) that may be used in evaluating experiments of this type. One
criterion focuses on conventional statistics, to determine if contrasting
base-rates have led to any discernible shift in response (significantly
different from zero). The other criterion which may be used when a pre-
cise normative model (such as Bayes’ theorem) is available, involves a
comparison of the subjects’ observed pattern of responses (e.g., predic-
tions), with the pattern that is implied by the formal model. Thus, in
Experiment II of the Wells and Harvey paper, it seems reasonably clear
that while the respondents were systematically affected by base-rate data
when predicting the behavior of individual others (i.e., significant re-
sults were obtained), they did not make optimal use of this infornation.
Salience and Attribution. Some recent papers indicate that apart
from matters of logic, attributional processes may be importantly affect-
ed by superficial manipulations that affect the perceptual salience of
information. For example, Ruble and Feldman (1976) showed that consen-
sus data was utilized most effectively when it was presented last in the
sequence of &dquo;background material&dquo; associated with a given action. They
suggest that earlier investigators (tiacarthur. 1972; Orvis et al, 1975)
may have underestimated the role of consensus by routinely presenting
consensus data at the beginning of the informational sequence (i.e., be-
fore informing the respondents as to the distinctiveness and consistency
of the behavior which was to-be-explained). Other researchers have pro-
vided further evidence concerning the effects of perceptual salience on
the attribution process (Storms, 1973; Pryor & Kriss, 1976). Taken to-
gether, these studies suggest that Kelley’s model may be incomplete in
its unrelenting attention to the logical implications of various data
matrices. Instead of searching for the underlying informational pattern
in a given situation, the naive attributer seems impulsively sensitive
to extraneous (non-logical) factors that influence the perceptual sali-
ence of potential causal agents.
The Self
Contemporary social psychologists have shown a remarkable converg-
ence of interest in the perceived self (or self-concept) that may not
yet have received full recognition. In any event, when I started on
this paper I had not realized the substantial regularity with which the
concept of self has been emphasized by diverse investigators, most of
whom share a cognitive orientation. The cognitive approach to social
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psychology thus appears to involve not only an increased emphasis on in-
tellective and inferential processes, but a burgeoning interest in the
self and its properties. What follows is a brief outline, indicating
some of the many research areas in which the self-concept has been invok-
ed as an explanatory concept, or has been studied as an end in itself by
cognitive social psychologists.
Cognitive Dissonance.
Investigators who were concerned with post-decisional phenomena were
among the first to emphasize the importance of the self-concept in the
context of dissonance theory (Malewski, 1962; Gerard, Blevans & Malcom,
1964). These researchers have shown that post-decisional effects may pri-
marily occur among respondents who have high self-esteem. Individuals
of this type normally regard themselves as good decision-makers. Hence
they may feel particularly distressed when they realize that a freely
chosen course of action conflicts with their favorable self-image, by re-
quiring that they accept one or more negative aspects associated with
their chosen alternative, while foregoing the positive feature(s) of an
option that they have rejected. According, to this view, following a
choice between conflicting alternatives, a person with high self-esteem
may be motivated to &dquo;3justify&dquo; his decision, thus derogating the rejected
option(s) and exaggerating the virtue(s) of the chosen alternative. By
contrast, a person with low self-esteem may be relatively unaffected by
post-decision dissonance, since in this case there would not be much dis-
crepancy between his negative self-evaluation and the knowledge that he
has (again) chosen a course or action that involves one or more undesir-
able elements.
At a more general level, the definition of cognitive dissonance has
undergone several changes since its initial formulation (Festinger, 1957).
One evolution has involved the introduction of such concepts as perceived
freedom and choice (both implying self-initiated behavior), which are
now thought to be of critical importance in the generation of an effect-
ive dissonant state. The main notion here is that dissonance arousal
may require a situation in which the individual believes that there is
an inconsistency between two cognitive elements, at least one of which
was freely chosen (by the self). For example, an important study by
Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) showed that dissonance effects depended
upon the respondents’ perceived freedom. When the subjects felt they had
a clear choice before writing a counter-attitudinal essay, a dissonance
effect was obtained, for opinion change was inversely related to the in-
centives that were available (high vs. low justification for the act in
question). Under these conditions, dissonance was presumably aroused be-
cause of the inconsistency between the respondent’s private views and the
counter-attitudinal message that he &dquo;freely&dquo; chose to write. On the other
hand, when the respondents felt that their prior behavior had been con- .
strained, opinion change was directly related to incentive levels.
Aronson (1968) has drawn additional attention to the self, contend-
ing that dissonance theory makes its clearest predictions in cases that
involve the disconfirmation of firm expectancies. Since we normally have
fairly certain expectancies regarding our own behavior (based on our self-
image), this implies that dissonance predictions are most likely to be rel-
evant if we can surreptitiously elicit a pattern of action (e.g., doing a
foolish thing) that is incompatible with the respondent’s view of himself
(e.g., as a reasonable, thoughtful person). By contrast, Aronson argues,
dissonance predictions may be less relevant in cases involving the be-
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havior of others, where our expectations are often quite tentative.
Attribution theory.
’ 
Attribution theorists have consistently emphasized the self, by as-
serting that the man in the street is spontaneously motivated to discover .
the causes that underlie human behavior, and by assuming that in this
quest two types of attributions are prominent: attributions to the indi-
vidual (i.e., self-initiated behavior), and attributions to external cir-
cumstances (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Bem, 1967).
While most attribution models emphasize the rational aspects of the at-
tribution process, recent research by Hansen and Donoghue (1977) focuses
on the disproportionate emphasis that we normally give to our _own actions
when predicting or assessing the behavior of others. In these studies,
people seemed to think that their own behavior was predictive of what most
others were likely to do in a given situation; by contrast, reports con-
cerning the actions that had been taken by other individuals did not have
much effect on their predictions. Similarly, in estimating the extent to
which someone else’s behavior appeared to derive from personal vs. situa-
tional causes, most respondents were very sensitive to the discrepancy
(if any) between their own actions and those taken by the target case;
people who behaved differently from themselves were generally thought-to
be acting deviantly, and reflecting the influence of internal (personal)
forces. Discrepancies between the actions of the target case and the
actions of others were less important in determining the causal explana-
tions (attributions) that seemed reasonable. These results appear to re-
flect an implicit assumption that our own actions are somehow more in-
formative than the acts of others, i.e., in estimating the typicality of
various behaviors and attempting to determine their causal origins,
we normally believe that our own actions provide a valuable basis for
judgment (perhaps they are especially salient), but we do not appear to
recognize that the behavior of another individual is as likely as our own
to be indicative of general population trends.
A cognitive (attributional) approach to achievement phenomena. Wein-
er’s recent work (1974) relating cognitive activity to achievement moti-
vation and achievement behavior provides a more complex example of the em-
phasis that attribution theorists give to the self. In this research,
an effort is made to comprehend the beliefs that people hold as to the
causes of their successes and failures. Weiner and his associates have
repeatedly shown that these causal explanations are systematically relat-
ed to the individual’s need for achievement. For example, people who have
strong achievement motives assume that the degree of effort expended in a
given task has a strong impact on the outcome, while those who are low in
achievement needs do not perceive much covariation between effort and out-
come. These contrasting cognitions may be an important determinant of the
fact that people who are high in n Ach tend to work more intensely than
their peers (if effort yields success, it is only reasonalbe to work hard).
Achievement motivation is also related to perceived ability, for those
with strong achievement needs normally see themselves as being relatively
able, while people who are low in n Ach do not.
Weiner and his associates have shown that these attributional differ-
ences can plausibly be related to previous research in the achievement do-
main. For example, people who are high in n Ach are more likely than oth-
ers to initiate achievement activities. Since these people generally
ascribe their past successes to internal factors (their own ability and
effort), they are led to experience greater satisfaction with the success
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ses that they have achieved in the past; this in turn is presumed to make
subsequent achievement goals more attractive. By contrast, those low in
n Ach are not as likely to explain their previous successes in terms of
internal factors; hence they experience previous successes as less grati-
fying, and are not so keenly attracted to new achievement-related activi-
ties.
Attributional explanations also seem pertinent to the problem of be-
havioral persistence. People who are high in n Ach normally explain past
failures as resulting from insufficient effort; this may enhance subse-
quent persistence at the task, since such a belief implies that a prev-
ious lack of success might well be reversed by &dquo;trying harder.&dquo; The
person who is low in achievement motivation, on the other hand, is more
likely to see his failure as resulting from insufficient ability, a lim-
itation that cannot readily be changed. Such people are likely to give up
relatively quickly when faced with a difficult task.
The self concept and its relation to behavior change.
Contemporary social psychologists often explain behavior change by con-
tending that the individual in question may have experienced a change in
self-image, leading to an overt behavioral adjustment. Explanations of
this type have also been popular among our clinical brethren, particularly
with those who have been influenced by Roger’s self-theory (1951). A re-
cent paper by Miller, Brickman, and Bolen (1975) provides us with an ex-
cellent example of this paradigm, for these investigators were able to pro-
duce significant behavioral changes among grade school children by chang-
ing their self-concepts. In one study, a group of fifth graders was re-
peatedly told that they were neat and tidy; this led to a decline in class-
room littering. In a second experiment, second grade children were re-
peatedly told either that they had good mathematical ability, or that they
were highly motivated in mathematics. Both of these attributions led to in-
creased self-esteem and to a significant gain in mathematical performance,
relative to a control group.
The foot in the door phenomenon. A study by Freedman and Fraser
(1966) established what is now known as the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.
In these experiments the respondent is induced to perform some small act
in behalf of someone else. Subsequently, this same respondent is asked
to perform a more demanding &dquo;favor.&dquo; The results indicate that people
who have performed the initial (undemanding) act are more likely to com-
ply with the second (more demanding) favor than those in a control group,
where no attempt has been made to establish an initial &dquo;foot-in-the-door.&dquo;
This type of effect appears to be quite robust, for it has been observed
even if the two requests are in unrelated domains and are presented by
different confederates, at different times. The foot-in-the-door effect
is commonly explained by positing some change’ in self-concept following
the initial (undemanding) act. The respondent who has performed a minor
favor for a stranger may thus regard himself as a more altruistic individ-
ual than before, and may therefore act more altruistically than those
assigned to a control condition (who have not been provided with an easy
opportunity to demonstrate their goodwill and social-mindedness).
Learned helplessness. Noxious experiences that unavoidably continue
despite the sufferers repeated attempts to escape from the situation some-
times interfere with subsequent efforts to cope effectively with solvable
problems. For example, a dog that is subjected to severe unavoidable
shock may be unable to respond adaptively in a later shock-avoidance set-
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up that can be readily mastered by control animals (Seligman, 1975). Sim-
ilar work has been conducted with humans, where it has been suggested
that the uncontrollable noxious experience may have lead to the develop-
ment of a helpless attitude, based on the belief that one’s efforts are
likely to be ineffective in dealing with such situations. A self-image
of this sort presumably mediates against the active striving that often
proves successful in dealing with the problems of life. Once again,
then, we have our familiar explanatory paradigm in which some antecedent
event (the presentation of an inescapable noxious stimulus) produces a
characteristic self-image (of relative helplessness), which in turn gener-
ates a systematic pattern of behavior (ineffectual performance in a nox-
ious but solvable situation).
Self efficacy as a determinant of behavior. Bandura, who is often
regarded as an advocate of the behavioral point of view, has also come
to emphasize the self as an important element in the control of behavior.
In a recent paper (Bandura, 1977) he argues for the view that the ther-
apeutic changes induced by different techniques may all derive from a com-
mon cognitive mechanism that involves an enhanced feeling of self-efficacy.
For example, expectations of self-efficacy are thought to determine such
things as whether the individual will attempt to cope with a difficult
situation, the amount of effort that will be expended, and how long cop-
ing efforts will be continued despite obstacles and aversive experien-
ces. In this model, estimates of personal efficacy are derived from past
performance accomplishments, vicarious experiences (observational learn-
ing), verbal persuasion (as in treatments involving interpretation), and
physiological states (people expect effective performance when they are
free from aversive arousal). To assess this theory, Bandura and his assoc-
iates conducted an experiment involving different methods for the treat-
ment of chronic snake phobias. Following treatment, individual reports
of self-efficacy were accurate predictors of performance (behavior), re-
gardless of the technique that was used to enhance the respondent’s feel-
ings of efficacy (Bandura, Adams & Beyer, 1977).
Overjustification and the forbidden toy experiments. Researchers who
are concerned with overjustification effects and those who have studied the
forbidden toy paradigm have also explained their results in self-concept
terms, emphasizing the idea that experimentally-induced changes in the self-
concept may lead to systematic changes in behavior. This explanation for
behavior change seems widely acceptable to psychologists with diverse
interests; it offers an explanatory &dquo;formula&dquo; that many cognitive social
psychologists find as appealing and broadly applicable as the contention
(to Skinnerians) that changes in behavior frequently derive from changes
in reinforcement contingencies. The boundary conditions that limit the
applicability of this &dquo;formula&dquo; have not been adequately explored, however.
In contrast to the notion that private beliefs about the self may in-
fluence overt behavior, a number of investigators have succeeded in producing
behavioral change, despite the fact that these changes were not accompanied
by the mediating cognitive states that they had presumed operative (Bem,
1972, and Nisbett & L~ilson, 1977, provide good reviews of this literature).
In one study, for example, (Valins & Ray, 1967), through a false feedback pro-
cedure, snake-phobic subjects were induced to believe that their heart-
rates were not affected by slide pictures of snakes. These subjects were
subsequently more willing to approach and handle a boa constrictor than
were people in a control condition, for whom the feedback stimuli were
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described as &dquo;extraneous sounds,&dquo; rather than &dquo;heartbeats.&dquo; Surprisingly,
however, the two groups of respondents did not differ when asked how
frightened they were of snakes.
The widely assumed relationship between self-concept and overt behav-
ior is also challenged by evidence which suggests that there is often a
weak and unstable correlation between self-reported personality traits and
behavior (Mischel, 1968), or between self-described attitudes and behav-
ior (Wicker, 1969). These embarrassments may be less critical than they
seem, however, when we recognize that &dquo;negative&dquo; results here may often
be due to unreliable, single-act criterion measures (see Fishbein & Azjen,
1974, McGowan & Gormley, 1976 and Schuman & Johnson, 1976 for more en-
couraging news on these issues).
The saliency of different self-attitudes.
~ 
A provocative thesis by Markus (1977) emphasizes the idea that the self
may fruitfully be regarded as a collection of cognitive generalizations
(self-schemata) that organize and guide the processing of self-related in-
formation. In this research, students with self-schemata that involved
dependence vs. independence were contrasted with those for whom this aspect
of the self was not salient; these latter respondents were termed aschemat-
ics, under the assumption that for them, the dependence-independence
schema was essentially inoperative. Subjects for whom dependence-inde-
pendence was a salient schema were more efficient than aschematic subjects
in processing information that relate’d to the dependence-independence di-
mension. For example, they showed faster response latencies when decid-
ing whether a schema-related trait (e.g., individualistic) was self-des-
criptive or not, and were more successful in retrieving specific behav-
ioral episodes that showed why a given trait (e.g., ambitious) might ap-
propriately be used to characterize them. This research is especially
interesting in its concern with the sorts of concepts and empirical meth-
ods that have recently occupied the attention of experimental psycholo-
gists. It also extends earlier work by Bem and Allen (1974), which show-
ed that for certain individuals (termed aschematics in Markus’ study) a
particular dimension might be unrelated to overt behavior, despite its
applicability for others.
Situational determinants of the spontaneous self-concept. While liar-
kus’ research (above) focuses on certain stable aspects of the self that
are involved in the organization and processing of relevant information,
McGuire-and Padawer-Singer (1976), have explored the idea that one’s
spontaneous self-image may be labile, and may depend in part on those as-
pects of the self that are distinctive at any given time. The guiding
notion here is that when called upon to consider who we are, we are drawn
to those aspects of ourselves that distinguish us within our social milieu.
As one concrete example, this conception suggests that since most people
are right-handed, lefties are more likely to include information regard-
ing handedness in their self-image than are righties. Similarly, the
spontaneous self-concept that affects the student in a classroom is more
likely to include an explicit reference to the physical attributes on
which he (or she) is unusual, as opposed to those attributes that do not
distinguish him (her) from the other members of the class.
Despite their differing methods and goals, Markus’ work, together
with that of McGuire and Padawar-Singer, and Bem and Allen, all converge
on the idea that a given aspect (or dimension) of the self may be vitally
important for some respondents, and virtually nonexistent for others.
Rather than assuming that individual differences in the self-image are
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primarily manifested in the subject’s self-placement with respect to var-
ious factors of Reneral significance, these investigators suggest that
it may be fruitful to recognize that when viewed from the individual’s
spontaneous perspective, some of these &dquo;general&dquo; factors may seem trivial
or inoperative.
Some Misgivings about Cognitive Social Psychology
Despite the unquestioned success of the cognitive approach in stimu-
lating systematic, theoretically-oriented research, some haunting ques-
tions remain as to the adequacy of this conception; even at its best, the
cognitive approach to social interaction seems far from complete. Purely
cognitive approaches to social psychology are, for example, challenged by
the claims of the socio-biologists and ethologists, who contend that social
life is importantly affected by biological and genetic factors (factors -
that are unlikely to be directly reflected in our rational cognitive pro-
cesses).
Similarly, motivational variables are given scant consideration by
nany cognitive theorists. This is doubtless a healthy corrective from
an earlier tradition in which unconscious motives, fantasies, and unbrid-
led emotional reactions were too-freely invoked to account for social ,
phenomena. On the other hand, the recent popularity of &dquo;cool&dquo; cognitive 
’
formulations like attribution theory should not blind us to the important
role of motivation and emotion in social phenomena. There is, for exam-
ple, reasonably good support for the idea that the experimental manipu-
lations associated with cognitive dissonance normally produce an eleva-
tion in arousal level, as proposed in Festinger’s original conception
(1957). A recent review by Kiesler and Pallak (1976) outlines several
lines of evidence that support this conclusion, including some studies
that involved a direct monitoring of physiological functioning, and others
that inferred arousal levels from the respondent’s performance in learn-
ing tasks based on the Hull-Spence (HxD) formulation. Zanna and Cooper
(1976) present additional support for the idea that counter-attitudinal
behavior may indeed produce a state of emotional arousal and go on to
show that this arousal is systematically related to attitude change.
Some final questions are particularly addressed to attribution theory,
which is presently the most influential of the cognitive approaches to
social psychology.
1. Are people in fact spontaneously interested in the causes that un-
derlie behavior? Or (as seems more reasonable) does their interest in
matters of this sort surface only sporadically, depending upon situational
factors and individual proclivities?
2. What is the relationship between attribution and behavior? Bem
(1972) has argued that attribution models as they are presently formulat-
ed are &dquo;mute&dquo; when applied to phenomena in which noncognitive response
classes constitute the behaviors which are to-be-explained (i.e., the
dependent variable). Unless more explicit attention is given to this
problem, however, the applications of attribution theory may be severely
limited, for it will be restricted to responses that are primarily intra-
cranial, without much implication for social behavior. Given the present
popularity of purely attributional approaches, a skeptic might infer that
social psychologists have largely given up their earlier interest in eluc-
idating the factors that influence social action, and are now much more
concerned with the variables that seem intuitively effective to the man-
in-the-street, regardless of their actual causal significance. On the
other hand, we should recognize that an effective analysis of the vari-
563
ables that control privately-held beliefs would be no small accomplish-
ment, even if these beliefs often proved ineffective as determinants of
overt behavior. We have already commented on the need for further work
detailing the relationship between the self-concept and overt action. A
parallel suggestion seems appropriate when we consider the reasonable
proposition that our reactions to others may be importantly affected by
the attributions that we assign to their behavior, rather than by the
sheer topography of their actions, &dquo;uncontaminated&dquo; by its apparent
causal background; The willful destructiveness of a schoolchild may be
punished, for example, while similar acts that derive from uncontrollable
physical incapacities will normally evoke a rather different response.
On the other hand, the available literature includes some surprises.
McGuire (1969) reviewed a number of attitude-change studies to determine
the impact of the respondent’s suspiciousness as to the intent underlying
the message that he or she received. He found little support for the
assumption that suspiciousness regarding the persuasive intent of the
message sender will normally reduce the opinion change that is observed.
Findings like this provide a stern challenge to the assumption that social
behavior can be readily predicted, once we are aware of the intentions
that the actor attributes to others.
Despite the concerns that are voiced above, the cognitive approach
to social psychology seems likely to retain its dominance in the coming
years because of its inherent virtues, its compatibility with the cul- .
tural zeit eist, and its well-developed theoretical and experimental
paradigms that enable ambitious investigators to complete systematic re-
search programs within a manageable budget of time and money. These con-
siderations (including the last-mentioned, matters of convenience) are im-
portant in any scientific movement, and it seems clear that they are, at
present, quite favorable for further developments in the cognitive ap-
proach to social psychology.
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